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Abstract. The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically
to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget
constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce
the dierent variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in
natural ways. We examine their stability by focusing on the existence of
Nash equilibria and envy-free assignments. We highlight the dierences
between these mechanisms and nd that only some of them exhibit both
notions of stability. This shows the importance of carefully picking the
right mechanism to ensure stable outcomes in the presence of budgets.
1 Introduction
Advertising on Internet search engines has evolved into a phenomenal driving
force both for the search engines and the advertising businesses. It is a modern
and rapidly growing method that is now being implemented in various other
popular sites beyond search engines, such as blogs, and social networking sites.
Although some rightful concern has been raised regarding privacy issues and
distinguishability from non-sponsored results, there are clear advantages to the
advertisers who can eciently reach their target audiences and observe the re-
sults of their ad campaign within days or even hours. At the same time, online
ads account for a large share of the prots for search engines and other partici-
pating web-sites. Even the web-user experience can be enhanced, by the delivery
of additional information relevant to their queries.
In a typical instance, a user queries a search engine for a particular keyword
of commercial interest, and the search engine determines the ads to be displayed
by means of an auction. The prevailing system uses a pay-per-click policy, i.e.,
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it only charges an advertiser when the user clicks on the corresponding link and
is diverted to the advertiser' s web-site.
The mechanism used can be viewed as an auction for multiple homogenous
indivisible items, the advertisement areas available, with single-demand buyers,
since it is not desirable for the same advertisement to appear more than once.
Such auctions can nd applications in a wide variety of scenarios besides In-
ternet advertising where buyers have a valuation per unit of a particular good
but the setting is restricted to selling only single xed-sized bundles. For exam-
ple, consider selling dierent xed-sized shipments of a food product when the
seller cannot send more than one shipment to the same destination or frequency
spectrum auctions of dierent xed-sized bandwidths where regulations do not
permit buying more than one continuous bandwidth. Noting that the mecha-
nisms can be applied in much dierent scenarios, we will work in the context
of Internet search advertising both because of its wide-spread application today
and also because of the signicant focus it receives in related literature.
In the early history of sponsored search auctions, the allocation of slots to
advertisers was determined by a rst-price auction, as in the systems originally
used by Overture. Later on, Google was the rst to switch to a second-price auc-
tion, an approach which demonstrated superior characteristics and was quickly
adopted by the rest of the major search engines. The main idea is that the ad-
vertisers declare how much they are willing to pay for a click to their ad but
they are charged instead a lesser amount equal to the next lower competing bid.
Apart from its elegant simplicity, this scheme has been quite successful in terms
of its generated revenue as well. In the literature, this system is commonly known
as the Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction and, by now, a large volume of
work has emerged on the study of GSP auctions and related mechanisms, see
e.g., the surveys [15] and [17].
However, an aspect that has been often ignored, especially in the early liter-
ature, is the presence of a budget constraint, requested from the advertisers to
limit their exposure and expenditure. We believe this is a key parameter, essen-
tial in accurately understanding and evaluating the systems used in practice.
Our contribution. Our main conceptual contribution is a study of Generalized
Second-Price auctions under the presence of budgets. First we showcase that ig-
noring these constraints might lead to unstable outcomes. We then introduce
three simple and natural extensions of the GSP mechanism, that take budgets
into account. As it is not straight-forward to dene a single natural mechanism,
we dene these variants motivated by the key desirable properties of second-price
auctions. For all mechanisms, we investigate the existence of Nash equilibria and
envy-free assignments, which are the main notions of stability that have been
considered in the literature. For the rst mechanism, we show that a Nash equi-
librium might not always exist, yet an envy-free assignment is always achievable.
For the other two mechanisms, we show that they always possess envy-free Nash
equilibria, in fact we show that any envy-free assignment can be realized as an
equilibrium of the mechanisms under consideration. In our model, we consider
the budget as part of a bidder's strategy, i.e., we have private budgets. An inter-
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esting and surprising outcome of our study is that in the case of public budgets
Nash equilibria do not always exist, despite the existence of envy-free assign-
ments. In contrast to mechanism design problems, where having public budgets
usually eases the design of a truthful algorithm, here we realized that having
public budgets may eliminate the existence of stable proles. Of separate inter-
est might be an algorithmic process than can construct an envy-free assignment
in our model.
1.1 Related work
Varian [19] and Edelman et al. [11] have been the two seminal works on equilib-
rium analysis of GSP auctions without budgets. They established the existence
of a Nash equilibrium which also satises other desirable stability properties
such as being welfare-maximizing and envy-free. A further analysis of envy-free
Nash equilibria, by taking into account the quality factor of the advertisers was
also provided in [16].
The notion of budget constraints has been introduced in various models
and objectives, such as, among others, in [4], [6], [12], [7] and [13]. Recent
work on truthful mechanism design, mainly inspired by the clinching auction
of Ausubel [3], has led to the introduction of truthful Pareto-optimal mecha-
nisms in the presence of budgets, see e.g. [10, 14, 9]. Ashlagi et al.introduced the
model we'll be using in [2]. However, all these mechanisms employ techniques
that are very dierent from the GSP scheme in order to achieve truthfulness.
As a result, they lack the simplicity of second price auctions at the expense of
achieving better properties.
The work of Arnon and Mansour [1] is conceptually closer to our approach.
They studied second-price auctions with budget constraints but their model
simplies the items for sale to clicks, as opposed to the slots, allowing a player
to potentially receive more or less clicks than a single slot could oer. This
deviates from the one player per slot paradigm used in practice.
Finally, a dierent direction that has been pursued recently is the perfor-
mance of mechanisms in terms of the generated social welfare. Price of Anarchy
analysis for auctions was initiated in [8], see also [5], for sponsored search auc-
tions without budgets. For certain settings with budget constraints, some results
have been recently obtained in [18] (which however do not have any implications
for our proposed mechanisms). Our work does not focus on Price of Anarchy,
which we leave for future research, but on existence of stability concepts.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model
Our model is the same as in Ashlagi et al. [2], a natural extension to budget
limited players of the model introduced by Varian [19] which is widely adopted
in related literature.
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We assume we have k slots, each with a xed, distinct4 and publicly known
click-through rate (CTR), j for slot j, representing the number of clicks received
in a xed time period (typically a day), independently of the advertisement
displayed. Let us order the slots such that 1 > 2 > : : : > k. Even though
the click-through rates are probabilistic in nature, we will make the typical
assumption that they are deterministically realized for simplication purposes;
i will really correspond to the expected click-through rate of slot i. Contrary
to the numerical ordering, we will typically use the terminology \higher" and
\lower" slots referring to slots of higher and lower CTR. Finally, for ease of
illustration, we will ignore the bidder-dependent quality factor that is usually
incorporated in calculating click-through rates in the separable model.
We have n  k players (advertisers). Each player i has a private valua-
tion vi representing the perceived value per click. Each player also has a budget
constraint Bi, indicating the total amount he is willing to spend in a xed time
period, not on a per click basis. We will also assume that these budget values are
pairwise distinct. This assumption has been necessary in other works as well [2],
and aects many properties in related mechanisms [10, 2]. In fact, as we will ex-
hibit later on, envy-free assignments, which is one of the stability concepts we are
interested in, are not guaranteed to exist when budgets are not distinct.Hence,
similarly to previous works, we also choose to adopt the distinctness of budgets.
Each player i is interested in maximizing s(i)(vi   p(i)), where s(i) is the
slot assigned to i and p(i) the accompanying price per click requested by the
respective mechanism. At the same time, he must also satisfy the budget con-
straint, s(i)p(i)  Bi. If this condition holds, we say the player can aord slot
s(i). We wish to enforce strict budget constraints so we dene the utility of the
players whose budget constraints are violated to be minus innity as is typically
done in the literature; any other negative value would also serve our purpose
(i.e., budget violations are less desirable than not getting a slot). More formally,
ui =
8<:0, if i was not awarded a slot,s(i)(vi   p(i)); if s(i)p(i)  Bi, 1; otherwise.
2.2 Second-Price Auctions under Budgets
The players submit value-bids bi, representing the maximum amount they are
willing to pay per click. These bids do not necessarily form a truthful declaration
of the players' values to the mechanism. Similarly, the players also submit a
budget-bid gi to declare their budget. We will use the term bid to refer to the
combination of these two types or to one particular type when clear from context.
In the case of ties, we assume there exists a xed a priori dened ordering of the
players based on which tie-breaking is resolved.
It is not trivial to introduce mechanisms that take budgets into account in
a straightforward and natural way. To address this, we rst ponder what con-
4 This assumption is derived from the distinct space these slots occupy on a web-page.
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stitutes a second-price mechanism by noting some key properties of generalized
second-price auctions:
 The slot allocation should be performed by a simple and ecient process.
 The allocation should be in accordance with the bid ordering. If a player
raises his bid he should be getting at least the slot he was getting before and
should he lower his bid he should be getting at most the previous slot.
 Furthermore, if a bidder raises his bid, this should cause his total payment
to potentially rise and respectively lowering his bid potentially lowers his
payment.
 Finally, the price per click for each slot should be determined by either the
next lower bid, the bid of the player awarded the next slot or the minimum
bid required to obtain the slot. While these three concepts coincide in the
regular GSP mechanism, this is not the case when one introduces budgets.
We rst consider the GSP mechanism without budgets in our context, only
to highlight that ignoring budgets can lead to unstable outcomes.
Denition 1 (Budget-Oblivious). The budget-oblivious second-price auc-
tion, in short, BOSP, orders the value-bids in decreasing order and then assigns
the slots in that order, ignoring the budget constraints. Naturally, the price for
each slot is determined by the immediately lower value-bid.
SinceBOSP, as is shown in Section 3, does not have good stability properties,
we turn our attention on mechanisms that respect the budget constraints by not
assigning slots/prices to players that can aord them as declared by their budget-
bids. The rst interpretation of second-price pricing, charging the next lower bid,
leads us to the following mechanism.
Denition 2 (Budget-Conscious by Price).We dene the budget-conscious
by price second-price auction, in short, BCSP(price), as the mechanism which
rst orders the value-bids in decreasing order and assigns a price per click for
each player equal to the immediately lower value-bid in the bid ordering. Then,
BCSP(price) assigns the players to slots in order of decreasing value-bids, re-
specting the budget constraints of each player as declared by their budget-bids,
by assigning each player to the highest unassigned slot he can aord with his
assigned price. If the player cannot aord any slot, he is left unassigned and he
is not charged anything.
Note that under this mechanism a player assigned to a slot might end up paying
more per click than a player in a higher slot but we are guaranteed that all
budget constraints of assigned players are satised. Also note that some slots
might end up unassigned if no player can aord to occupy them.
The mechanism above is a natural way to guarantee budget compliance but
raises a fairness issue, as players might be declaring value-bids as the maximum
amount they are willing to pay and getting a slot that they cannot aord to pay
if they were to pay their own bid. As will be evident in the later sections, this
can lead to players intentionally raising their bid to just below their competitor's
bid. The following mechanism addresses this.
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Denition 3 (Budget-Conscious by Bid). We dene the budget-conscious
by bid second-price auction, in short, BCSP(bid), similarly to BCSP(price)
except the mechanism now requires the players to be able to aord their slot if
they were to pay a price per click equal to their own value-bid. The players are
ordered in decreasing order of value-bids and the price of each player is set to
the next lower bid. Then, the players are assigned from the highest bidder to the
lower, one by one, to the highest available unassigned slot that they can aord
should they were to pay their own bid.
The second way of interpreting second-price prices, charging prices equal to the
value-bid of the player ending up occupying the next slot, rst, has denitional
issues since we cannot know if our player can aord a slot without knowing who
gets the next one and secondly, might charge a player more than his bid. For
these reasons, we do not investigate mechanisms of this type in this work.
Finally, we introduce a mechanism that considers what the players are willing
and aord to pay for a slot by considering the minimum as implied from their
value and budget bids. This mechanism essentially captures pricing by charging
the minimum amount required to obtain a slot.
Denition 4 (Best Oer Budget-Conscious).We dene the best oer bud-
get-conscious second-price auction, in short, BCSP(best offer), as the mech-
anism which intuitively awards each slot to the player that can oer the most
\money" but charges them the next lower amount oered. More formally, each
slot s, one by one from higher to lower, is awarded to the unassigned player
with the largest minfbi; gi=sg and he is charged a price per click equal to the
second largest such value among unassigned players. We note that under this
mechanism, the price charged for each slot is the minimum bid required to secure
the slot. Alternatively, one can think of the slot rewarded to the player with the
highest minfsbi; gig, and paying the second highest such amount, representing
the total oer of the player and the total price charged.
It should be pointed out that a slot in BCSP(best offer), in turn of decreasing
CTR, is oered to the player who is willing to pay the most, given that does
not violate his declared budget; he is then charged what the second such player
would pay (not counting players who already got a slot). Whereas in the previous
two budget-conscious mechanisms, each player, in turn of its bid, chooses the
best object he can aord and pays the bid of the next player in line. The above
two approaches are obviously equivalent in any mechanism that does not refuse
giving a slot to a player who cannot aord it. However, once we introduce into
the mechanism the additional requirement of refusing to give objects to anybody
who cannot aord it, then the above distinction becomes necessary.
In all mechanisms, we assume that players not awarded a slot are not charged
a payment and that the price of the lowest bidding player is zero, should he be
awarded a slot. Finally, given a nite set of players, we note that the allocation
of slots and pricing can be determined eciently in all dened mechanisms.
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2.3 Stable assignments
It is easy to see that none of the mechanisms dened above are incentive-
compatible. There are cases where a player might receive a higher utility by
\lying" about his value and getting a lower slot at a benecial price, even if
other players are truthfully bidding their values. Naturally, we turn our atten-
tion to notions of stability, a requirement to analyze signicant properties of
these auctions and in general a desired property for the advertisers as well. As
usual, we will focus on the notion of Nash equilibrium.
Denition 5 (Nash Equilibrium). A prole of bids, hbi; gii for each player i,
forms a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to deviate to a dierent
strategy hb0i; g0ii, for any hb0i; g0ii.
In related work [19, 11], the notion of symmetric or envy-free equilibrium was
dened. Under the generalized second-price auction without budget constraints,
this class of envy-free equilibria is a subset of Nash equilibria.
Denition 6 (Envy-Free Assignment). We dene an envy-free assignment
as a slot allocation s(), where no slot is left unassigned, along with a set of prices
per click p(), assigning slot s(i) to player i and charging him p(i) per click, such
that for all players i we have
8i0 with 1  s(i0)  k; ui 

maxfs(i0)(vi   p(i0)); 0g; if s(i0)p(i0)  Bi,
0, otherwise,
where ui is the utility of player i as dened earlier.
Note that an envy-free assignment also guarantees rationality : p(i)  vi for
all players i. We say that an envy-free assignment is realizable under a certain
mechanism, if a set of bids exists such that the allocation and pricing generated
by the mechanism under this set of bids matches the allocation and pricing of
the envy-free assignment.
Under BOSP, where slot allocation depends only on the value-bids and not
on the budgets or budget-bids, the constraints on the bids that realize an envy-
free assignment are stricter than those of a Nash equilibrium. The same holds
for BCSP(bid), as all players can pay their own bid for their slot and intuitively
cannot be forced out of position by someone else' s bid5. Similarly, under BC-
SP(best offer), a player cannot get a higher slot without paying more than
the current player occupying the slot; again a realizable envy-free assignment
eectively produces a Nash equilibrium. Hence, under the mechanisms BOSP,
BCSP(bid), BCSP(best offer), the realizable envy-free assignments form a
subset of the set of Nash equilibria.
Under BCSP(price) however, the slot allocation is dependent on budgets
and intuitively, one could alter the allocation to his benet by forcing other
5 In more detail, the instability arises when some player can alter his bid to raise
someone else' s price, forcing the mechanism to evict him from his slot based on
budget constraints and subsequently beneting the rst player.
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players out of budget, hence there might exist bids that realize an envy-free
assignment but do not form a Nash equilibrium.
For the other direction, it is trivial to nd an example where the outcome of
a Nash equilibrium is not an envy-free assignment in all mechanisms building on
the intuition that someone might be envious of someone else' s higher slot but
they are not able to get it at that price.
3 The Budget-Oblivious Second-Price Auction
BOSP lacks the notions of stability dened earlier.
Theorem 1. There are settings where no Nash equilibrium exists under BOSP.
A simple counterexample is a game with two slots with rates 1 and 0.4 and three
players with value/budget 50/50, 16/5 and 8/2 and the proof is presented in the
full version.
Since under BOSP, realizable envy-free assignments are a subset of Nash
equilibria it follows that:
Corollary 1. There are settings where no realizable envy-free assignment exists
under BOSP.
Let us point out here that in Lemma 3, stated below, we show that envy-free
assignments always exist (under the assumption of distinctness of budgets). By
the above corollary, such assignments are not realizable under BOSP.
4 The Budget-Conscious by Price Second-Price Auction
We now turn our attention to BCSP(price). We rst show
Theorem 2. There are settings in which no Nash equilibrium exists for BCSP-
(price).
To prove Theorem 2, we will rst show that Nash equilibria do not always
exist in the special case where players are budget-bidding their true constraints
and then extend the result to the general case.
Lemma 1. There are settings where players are budget-bidding their true con-
straints, and no Nash equilibrium exists under BCSP(price).
Proof. Consider two slots with 1 = 1; 2 = 0:4 and 3 players with attributes
as shown in Figure 1. We assume that the tie-breaking ordering favors player
3 and then player 2. In order to show that a Nash equilibrium does not exist
we have to consider all orderings of bids and for each such case all possible slot
assignments. Intuitively, we will showcase two types of instability. If a bid is low
so that the player paying it has the budget constraint satised then it can be
easily overbid or if a bid is high then underbidding below it will force that player
out of budget for the slot.
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Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
Value 50 16 8
Budget 50 5 2
Fig. 1. Example of non-existence of Nash equilibrium under BCSP(price), having two
slots with 1 = 1; 2 = 0:4.
We start by considering the case where b1 > b2 > b3 and slot 1 is assigned to
player 1 and slot 2 to player 2. This means that these players can aord these
slots, therefore we must have b2  50 and b3  12:5. If b2 > 5 then player 1 can
bid b2 " > b3, for some small ", and still get slot 1 at a lower price, since player
2 cannot aord it. If b2  5 then player 3 can bid b2 + " < b1 and gain strictly
positive utility.
If player 1 is assigned to slot 2 because he cannot aord it and player 2 gets
slot 1, we must have b2 > 50 and b3  5. If player 1 bids b2   " > 5 > b3, then
player 2's bid will be the highest bid but he will not be able to aord slot 1
anymore, which will end up at player 1 for a lower price per click than before.
The rest of the cases follow similarly and we present them in the full version
of this paper. ut
Lemma 2. Under BCSP(price), if a Nash equilibrium exists then a Nash equi-
librium also exists where the players are budget-bidding their true constraints.
To prove Lemma 2, we show that when a player changes his budget-bid to his
true budget the same slot allocation can be achieved. This is combined with an
adequate shifting of value-bids that maintains the same prices and that concludes
the proof of Lemma 2 and of Theorem 2.
Despite the non-existence of Nash equilibria, all envy-free assignments are
realizable under BCSP(price) (and there exists at least one such assignment).
Theorem 3. There exists an envy-free assignment which is realizable under
BCSP(price).
The proof of the Theorem is based on Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 below.
Lemma 3. Under budget constraints, there always exists an envy-free assign-
ment.
Proof outline: We present a proof outline. We rst note that an envy-free
assignment can always be obtained from the mechanism in [2]. We present here
an alternate way to obtain an envy-free assignment. Our procedure produces a
dierent assignment than that of [2] in some settings, has a shorter proof and
we believe it has some value on its own.
We run the following procedure that completes with all slots assigned in an
envy-free assignment. The slots are initially free and have an assigned innite
price. We pick a free slot and lower its price until some player can obtain non-
negative utility, at which point we award him the slot at that price and stop
lowering it.
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We repeat similarly with other slots but allow players that are assigned to
request the particular slot if its price makes it more benecial for them. This
leads to a reassignment of the player. We then eectively maintain the envy-free
conditions during the whole process.
We have to be more careful when a player can receive equal utility from his
assigned slot and the slot whose price is being lowered as we cannot further lower
either price without potentially inducing envy or innite switch loops among the
players. We deal with this by simultaneously lowering both prices in a uniform
manner and by a careful analysis on potential outcomes and progress measures
to guarantee the termination and maintenance of envy-free conditions. For more
details, we refer the reader to the full version of the paper. 
Lemma 4. Any envy-free assignment is realizable under BCSP(price).
We dene value bids such that the mechanism produces the same allocation and
prices as in the envy-free assignment. The budget-bids can be set to match the
true budgets of the players.
5 Budget-Conscious by Bid and Best Oer Second-Price
Auctions
Recall that under BCSP(bid) and BCSP(best offer), realizable envy-free
assignments are a subset of Nash equilibria. We are going to show that for these
two mechanisms, Nash equilibria exist, by establishing that envy-free assign-
ments are realizable in both BCSP(bid) and BCSP(best offer). Given an
envy-free assignment, we pick the bids such that the mechanism assigns the play-
ers in the desired slots and achieves the same prices. The proofs of the following
theorems are presented in the full version.
Theorem 4. Under BCSP(bid), there is always a Nash equilibrium that pro-
duces an envy-free assignment.
Theorem 5. Under BCSP(best offer), there is always a Nash equilibrium
that produces an envy-free assignment.
Note that in both theorems we need to set the budget-bids of the players dierent
from their true budgets. It turns out this is necessary, a perhaps surprising
result as having budgets publicly known was necessary for truthful mechanisms
in related work [10, 2].
Theorem 6. There are settings with public budgets, where a Nash equilibrium
does not exist under both BCSP(bid) and BCSP(best offer).
As envy-free assignments realizable under BCSP(bid) or BCSP(best offer)
form a subset of Nash equilibira of these two mechanisms, respectively, the The-
orem above implies that there are settings where neither of these mechanisms
can realize any envy-free assignment (guaranteed to exist by Lemma 3), unless
players are allowed to bid non-true budgets.
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6 Discussion
The consideration of several variants of mechanisms, introduced not out of idle
curiosity, but as representations of all the natural answers to natural questions
raised by the introduction of budgets, and the examination of their properties
and dierences is what we consider as our primary contribution in this work. We
believe our work can serve as a starting point for studying further the properties
of GSP auctions under budget constraints. Although we studied these auctions
in the context of sponsored search, second-price auctions are widely used in many
dierent settings both in o-line and on-line scenarios. As such, our results are
applicable in a much wider context.
In the area of sponsored search, a further step is required towards the more
accurate modeling of the deployed systems. In practice, a player can transition
between slots during a time period, as players are moderated according to their
budget depletion rate. Similarly to the majority of related work on keyword
auctions with budgets, we chose to study the static setting rst both as a stepping
stone and in its own interest for settings outside of keyword auctions. An analysis
on the eects of budget constraints in a dynamic setting that would extend upon
our results, would contribute towards a more accurate modeling of sponsored
search auctions. Another interesting direction for future research is to evaluate
the performance of these mechanisms in terms of the generated welfare. This
type of Price of Anarchy analysis for non-truthful auctions was initiated in [8],
and for certain settings with budget constraints, some results have been recently
obtained in [18].
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